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Abstract 
The Irish economy has had one of the worst experiences of economic crisis within the EU 
since the onset of international financial crisis in 2007/8. That the crisis has an international 
dimension is beyond question. What needs to be explored further is the contribution of 
domestic political factors which weakened the capacity of the Irish political system to 
respond and which exposed Ireland to a worse crisis than might otherwise have occurred. 
Three institutional clusters are analysed: the political priorities and decision-making routines 
underlying the Irish growth model; the configuration of the public administration system; 
and the management of the domestic cost base. In all three, urgent priorities for reform are 
identified. The paper does not advocate reform of the electoral system, which tends to 
attract more media attention than is warranted. Rather, it argues that energy and 
intelligence needs to be devoted to reforming the quality of decision-making, limiting 







The economic crisis that originated in the US financial system in 2007 quickly radiated 
outwards to embrace most of the wealthier countries of the world. What caused the 
contagion to spread so rapidly was the fact that financial markets have become 
internationalized so rapidly. Countries had been motivated to free up transnational capital 
mobility since the 1980s by the recognition that investment flows could boost prosperity, 
and by a variety of incentives and pressures emanating from international institutions such 
as the OECD and the IMF that were committed to the merits of deregulation. The 
interdependence of financial markets, and their scale relative to national political systems, 
provided the context for the crisis  (Crotty 2009).  
But the global economic crisis, while inducing recession and creating major shocks for all the 
economies of the developed world, has been experienced rather differently in different 
countries. This is partly attributable to the variations in the role played by finance capital in 
the overall economic system. Notwithstanding some variations in financial practices, 
‘coordinated’ capitalist economies of continental Europe tended to have more highly 
regulated banking sectors and lower levels of exposure to stock market fluctuations than 
the ‘liberal’ market economies, a category that includes Ireland, Britain, and the USA 
(Culpepper 2005; Hall and Soskice 2001). But what also needs to be taken into account is 
the variation in countries’ domestic conditions which resulted in a greater or lesser degree 
of exposure to private sector indebtedness, expansion of the financial sector, and different 
evaluations of risk, all of which conditioned the severity with which the financial crisis 
eventually struck. Among the domestic factors that make a difference to outcomes are the 
institutional arrangements for decision-making and policy implementation, and the nature 
of each country’s involvement with the international economy.  
This is not simply a function of country size. Some of the countries that experienced 
particularly bad recessions during the current crisis are indeed small, including Ireland, 
Iceland, and the Baltic States. But if the contraction in GDP and a recession-induced increase 
in unemployment are the principal measures of how severely a country’s well-being has 
been affected in the short term, what is perhaps most striking is that many other small 3 
 
countries such as the Scandinavian countries, but also smaller post-communist countries 
such as Slovakia and Slovenia, have not suffered to anything like the same degree, as Figure 
1 shows. Indeed, these countries’ performance is closer to that of the larger European 
countries such as Germany, France and the UK than to that of the more severely affected 
smaller economies.  
Figure 1 here 
Furthermore, if we look at the fiscal consequences of economic crisis, Figure 2 shows that 
the Baltic states and other postcommunist countries, which entered the crisis with relatively 
little accumulated debt, also experienced relatively low fiscal deficit crises. Countries that 
had long experienced difficulties in keeping their total debts within Maastricht guidelines 
such as Italy and Belgium were not now the most severely affected by budget deficits. A 
cluster of countries emerges as having a particularly severe fiscal crisis, well above European 
averages: these are, in ascending order of gravity, Spain, the UK, Greece, and Ireland. 
Maintaining borrowing requirements and refinancing accumulated debt turned out to be 
particularly difficult for the EU ‘cohesion’ economies of Spain, Greece, and Ireland, as the 
risk assessment agencies on which bond market investors rely began to lower their ratings 
for these countries’ borrowing requirements. The near-crisis in the Greek sovereign debt in 
spring 2010 initiated a new set of challenges to the EU to review the commitment that there 
would never be any ‘bail-out’ of countries in difficulty, and to re-evaluate the nature of 
economic governance in the EU as a whole (Baldwin and Gros 2010; Mody 2009; Van 
Rompuy 2010). 
Figure 2 here 
This paper outlines some of the respects in which Ireland turned out to be dangerously 
exposed to external shocks. In retrospect it is more easily seen that policies that might 
merely have been unwise in the absence of economic crisis increased the risk of disastrous 
consequences when the international context changed. Three institutional clusters are 
considered here, each of which contributed to the particularly Irish experience of crisis. The 
first concerns the turn taken by the Irish growth model during the 2000s, centring in 
particular on the tax incentives underlying industrial policy and the balance struck between 4 
 
exporting and non-exporting sectors. The second concerns the public administrative system 
charged with policy coordination and expert advice. The third concerns the management of 
the cost base of the economy in the context of European Monetary Union. 
The Irish growth model  
The core elements of the Irish growth model have been in place more or less continuously 
since the 1960s, but it has gone through several reputational waves since then. The 
commitment to a low corporation tax regime as a principal means of attracting inward 
foreign direct investment, and charging a state agency with targeting potential growth 
sectors, were elements of the policy mix that have not varied fundamentally since the 1960s 
(Bradley 2000; FitzGerald 2000). During the 1980s, recessionary conditions generated new 
questions about the robustness of the measures in place to support domestic innovation 
and entrepreneurship. But the basic policy orientation was not only unchanged but put on a 
firmer footing with the completion of the Single European Market in the early 1990s. 
Following the stabilization of the public finances and a renewed commitment to 
macroeconomic stability, Ireland was particularly well placed to benefit from the surge of 
internationally mobile capital seeking investment opportunities within the European Union. 
In addition to a strong export-oriented and largely foreign-owned manufacturing sector 
concentrated in pharmaceuticals and information and communications technology, a new 
phase of development of internationally traded services, particularly computer software 
and financial services, began to take off.  The so-called Celtic Tiger was not very Celtic at all, 
but the domestic spin-off growth was particularly strong during the 1990s and 2000s (Barry 
1999; Barry, Bradley and O'Malley 1999; Honohan and Walsh 2002; MacSharry and White 
2000; O'Sullivan 2000).  
However, policy imbalances began to emerge in three areas. Firstly, the relative 
performance of the export-oriented and domestic sectors began to shift. FDI in 
manufacturing levelled off, but the availability of cheap credit that followed membership of 
the Euro created new kinds of incentives in the domestic economy. Inward capital flows 
were not directed toward the most efficient investment opportunities, but rushed into the 
most readily available domestic sector, which was construction activity. The Irish economy 5 
 
entered a classic asset price bubble. Political opinion was slow to respond, since the building 
industry generated so much employment, doubling between the last 1990s and mid-2000s. 
Rising house values were a welcome development for those already on the property ladder, 
while any fall in property values would create negative equity traps for the most recent 
entrants, mostly younger voters, the politically significant first-time buyers. Politicians had 
multiple incentives to keep the bubble inflating, while hoping against hope for the 
proverbial soft landing. Meanwhile, the conditions for a very hard fall were accumulating 
(Hay 2009; M Kelly 2009).  
Secondly, the easy credit conditions in a world of capital mobility facilitated the growth of 
the financial sector. Competition between banks for lending opportunities not only drove up 
the speculative bubble in property, but intensified the incentives to relax due diligence and 
conventional risk assessment measures. The share of the financial sector in total value-
added made up 10.6% in 2007 in Ireland, compared with only 5% on average in the euro 
area (European Commission 2010, p.5). The expansion of lending liabilities happened with 
astonishing speed. Net lending by credit institutions in Ireland to Irish residents grew from 
10% at the end of 2003 to 41% of GDP by the end of 2005, indicating the extent to which the 
Irish financial sector was able to draw on international funding – but also the extent to 
which it would be exposed in the event of a downturn (Honohan 2006). Growth in banking 
of that speed and on that scale should have rung alarm bells with the Financial Regulator. 
But Ireland had adopted the British and US model of ‘light touch’ regulation, and had split 
the functions of banking oversight away from the Central Bank to a new specialized 
institution which did little to monitor the banks’ own claims that they were adequately 
capitalized and could ensure that risk was properly assessed. The scale of the institutional 
and procedural regulatory reforms undertaken after the collapse of the financial system 
reveals, with hindsight, how poorly managed the system had been (Central Bank and 
Financial Services Authority of Ireland 2010; Honohan 2010). The extent of the collapse of 
the Irish financial system has been revealed in stages, as estimates of the full scale of 
taxpayer liability crept upwards, and the cost of indirect recapitalization through 
government intervention in bad property loans was subject to regular upward revision. 6 
 
Figure 3 below shows that Irish taxpayer liabilities for the distressed financial sector 
outstripped those of other countries by a significant margin. 
Figure 3 here 
Thirdly, the imbalances in economic activity were further intensified by government support 
for tax breaks to support construction activity (TASC 2010). The tax incentives that 
encouraged investment in property were warmly welcomed by property developers and 
builders. A further benefit accrued to many high-earners who were able to shield income 
from tax liability through tax-incentivized property investments. A strong value commitment 
to low personal income tax rates had taken hold within the Fianna Fáil-Progressive 
Democrat coalition that held power between 1997 and 2007. Buoyant revenue yields from 
property transactions made it possible to continue to fund tax cuts. But the increasing 
reliance on bubble revenues exposed the tax base to risk in the event of a downturn, even 
before the scale of recessionary collapse depressed other revenue sources such as income 
and expenditure taxes (Regling and Watson 2010, p.27).  
What these developments reveal is a growing imbalance at the heart of the Irish growth 
model itself. On the one hand, thinking about future economic development possibilities 
was developing along lines of ‘the smart economy’ and ‘the knowledge-intensive economy’, 
and new bodies charged with supporting science and technology innovation were set up 
(Department of the Taoiseach 2008; Science Foundation Ireland 2009). On the other hand, 
basic investments in science and maths education at primary and second-level were lacking; 
venture capital was scarce; infrastructural investments were patchy; and investment in 
research and development was well below that of the leading smaller European countries, 
as Figure 4 below shows. 
Figure 4 here 
Despite the existence of supports for micro-enterprises and a proliferation of active 
entrepreneurship, the life-cycle of small to medium-sized domestic enterprises was 
alarmingly short and the capacity of the Irish economy to grow viable and especially export-
oriented indigenous firms remained limited (Forfás 2008b; National Competitiveness 7 
 
Council 2007; O Riain forthcoming). A basic inconsistency had developed in the policy stance 
toward economic growth. Powerful interests in the less productive sectors enjoyed 
continued political support. The more difficult and longer-term strategic investments lagged 
considerably.  
The poor policy mix that emerged during the 2000s is often attributed to the electoral 
incentives to which politicians are subject. There are two respects in which this has been 
argued to be relevant. Firstly, the Irish electoral system, PR-STV, encourages voters to 
evaluate individual politicians as well as party stance (Marsh 2007). An ongoing concern is 
that the politicians who are most successful at the polls are the ones who devote most time 
to attending to local service, potentially at the expense of national policy deliberation. A 
further concern is that the requirement of intensive constituency service is a strong 
disincentive to political involvement for people who may have a strong policy motivation 
but who are less willing to engage with detailed local service demands.  
The second consideration often held to be responsible for a poor policy mix concerns the 
nature of party funding. Parties benefit to varying degrees from corporate donations, but 
the largest party, Fianna Fáil, which has dominated electoral politics since the foundation of 
the state, tends to be the greatest beneficiary. Despite some reforms in scrutiny and 
oversight, the accountability of parties for electoral funding remains limited, leaving open 
the suspicion, at the least, that powerful interests play a disproportionate role in shaping 
the agenda of government (Byrne 2010; MacCarthaigh 2005). 
The first of these explanations is problematic. The electoral system may amplify a localism 
that is grounded in weak local government and a strong expectation of personal 
involvement with elected politicians, but reforming the electoral system would not 
necessarily change these features of Irish political life (Bowler, Farrell and Pettitt 2005; 
Sinnott 2010). The quality of candidates drawn to involvement in Irish public life may have 
less to do with the electoral system than with the working conditions of the Oireachtas 
itself, and especially the Dáil, with long and late sitting hours and other family-unfriendly 
practices. But what may be more at issue is the poor functioning of the legislature itself, and 
the very weak powers it has in policy deliberation, amendment of statutes, and intensive 8 
 
policy scrutiny in committees. Ireland stands out as an extreme example of parliamentary 
weakness, compared with the spectrum of European countries (Döring 2001).  
The second consideration outlined above – the insider role that powerful interests may 
exercise – flows directly from this feature of Irish institutional design. Governments are not 
readily held to account by the legislature. Questionable decision-making is difficult to 
challenge, and true accountability is hard to enforce. Rules about disclosure of party funding 
were introduced in the wake of a series of high-profile corruption scandals during the 1990s 
and 2000s. But the suspicion remains that they are more honoured in the breach than the 
observance. The Irish party system does not feature conventional political cleavages, and 
the largest parties have long been characterized as catch-all parties, prone to a degree of 
populism to build and secure broad-based coalitions of support (Mair and Marsh 2004). The 
permeability of the party system by powerful interests – especially of the largest party, 
Fianna Fáil – is not readily addressed either through reform of the electoral system or of the 
rules governing political donations.  
A more effective remedy is likely to be found through structural reform of the functioning of 
the legislature itself. There is widespread agreement that there are many shortcomings in 
the Standing Orders, in the powers available to committees, in the capacity of the 
government to dominate the parliamentary agenda. But to date, there has been little 
willingness on the part of those who benefit more extensively from this system to undertake 
the serious and fundamental reform that would be required to change matters.  
The full scale of the economic crisis in Ireland began to take shape shortly after a general 
election that re-elected Fianna Fáil to government in 2007, this time with the Greens as a 
minority coalition partner. Unlike other countries that had experienced major crisis, no 
change of government had happened that would replace those held to have been 
responsible for the onset of crisis with an alternative charged with cleaning up political life. 
The onus of responsibility is therefore likely to rest with whatever government is formed 
after the coming election. Whether they have the zeal to engage in real reform, or do as 
incumbent governments typically do, and enjoy the powers accruing to them as office-
holders, remains to be seen. 9 
 
Public administration and policy expertise 
What the preceding overview of a poor policy mix also reveals is an apparent dearth of 
capacity for coherent and consistent policy-making – that is, a lack of ‘joined-up 
government’, gaps in informed technical analysis of policy sectors, and a poor capacity to 
anticipate adverse performance outcomes and to take precautionary action to avert or 
manage these.  
We might distinguish two respects in which Irish policy processes have been revealed as 
deficient. The first is a weak capacity for making coherent fiscal policy in the context of 
membership of the Eurozone; the second is the organizational dispersal of policy expertise. 
Fiscal policy practices 
A recurring issue in Irish macroeconomic policy is the tendency to run pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy (Benetrix and Lane 2009; Lane 1998; 2003). During periods of economic growth, 
governments spend freely; when economic downturn sets it, there is no reserve to soften 
the impact. This leads governments to take severe measures to prevent the progressive 
escalation of borrowing requirements, but the spending cutbacks and increased taxation 
further exacerbate the impact of recession and make recovery even more difficult.  
Until the 1970s, Irish fiscal policy was quite orthodox and conservative. During the 1970s, 
governments began to experiment with pump-priming spending measures, even prior to the 
‘give-away’ election of 1977, and failure to reverse these trends during an international 
economic upturn left Ireland even more exposed than it needed to be during the downturn 
of the 1980s. The runaway public sector borrowing requirement then had to be corrected 
under conditions of recession and high and sustained unemployment. The Celtic Tiger 
period saw a return to the old practices of additional fiscal stimulus which amplified the 
effects of already super-normal growth. 
The explanation for consistently pro-cyclical fiscal policy in Ireland is generally sought in the 
area of party politics. Short-term electoral cycles, it is held, prevail over other 
considerations, during the good times (Honohan 1999). Yet Irish governments have been 
more effective at correcting fiscal over-runs than, for example, Greek governments have 10 
 
been, so when it is perceived as necessary, they will incur electoral dissatisfaction to 
undertake unpalatable stabilizing measures. 
The time-inconsistent policy preferences of Irish governments have their origins in low 
levels of technical analysis of the economic situation. Fianna Fáil Finance Minister Charlie 
McCreevy (1997-2004), famously commented on his expansionary budget measures in the 
run-up to the 2001 budget, that ‘when I have it, I spend it’. Although he introduced some 
inflation-curbing spending cuts in his two subsequent budgets, this remark is revealing. 
There is nothing here of the prudential macroeconomic management thinking which Irish 
governments have been repeatedly urged to undertake by academic commentators. Simple 
short-term accounting practices prevail over longer-term analysis of how best to manage 
cyclical movements. And while it is true that Ireland ran fiscal surpluses during most years 
during the 2000s prior to the crisis, this could be described as accidental rather than 
intentional. Jim O’Leary, academic economic commentator, has noted that external 
observers of the Irish economic situation may have flagged some underlying weaknesses in 
the revenue base, but that no-one shouted any warnings, because of the net positive fiscal 
performance (O'Leary 2010). And yet the Scandinavian countries, which had suffered severe 
financial crises during the early 1990s, were committing to strong fiscal surpluses during the 
2000s, as Figure 5 below shows. It is now apparent that Ireland, with its extraordinarily high 
growth performance during the 1990s and 2000s, should also have been taking stronger 
fiscal precautionary measures to manage the deflationary consequences of the return to 
‘normal’ growth, not to mind protecting against the hazard of recession.  
Figure 5 here  
It would appear that similar weaknesses in technical economic analysis underlie the failure 
of the Irish government to take effective measures to curb the property bubble. Low 
interest rates, from which Ireland was benefiting due to its participation in European 
Monetary Union, were inappropriate to the Irish high-growth context. In the absence of any 
capacity to manage interest rates, the only effective measures open to government were 
fiscal (Conefrey and FitzGerald 2010). Yet there seems to have been little sense of how to 
intervene effectively; and indeed, as we have already noted, policy was enthusiastically 11 
 
rolled out in the reverse direction, providing fiscal incentives that further inflated the 
bubble. 
The explanation for poor-quality fiscal management must therefore extend beyond party 
politics to consider the staffing and organization of the public service itself and the quality of 
the advice available to governments, and to the high levels of operational discretion 
available to Ministers that is institutionalized within the Irish parliamentary system. 
Reflection on the role of the Department of Finance and the quality of its economic analysis, 
though not new, has gained new life in Ireland (Molloy 2010; Tutty 1994). But more broadly 
than this, the culture of generalism within the Irish civil service has come into some 
question. Like the British system, the Irish civil service has relied on competitive intake and 
internal on-the-job learning. But unlike the British, the Irish system has not introduced new 
streams of acquiring specialist expertise to remedy the skills deficiencies that a generalist 
system entails in a world in which increased specialization and technical competence are at 
a premium. There is virtually no experience of external appointment to senior positions and 
no fast-stream recruitment and promotion of qualified graduates. There is no specialist 
cadre of professional expertise available to all Departments analogous to Britain’s 
Government Economic Service. And while the Department of Finance may recruit 
economics graduates, there is little or no routine professional contact between these and 
the economic profession in the universities and in the private sector. These deficiencies in 
technical expertise contribute to the very large sums the Irish government increasingly pays 
to private sector consultancies for policy advice. And still the Comptroller and Auditor 
General is able to comment, in his 2009 report, on ‘the need to improve the capacity of 
departments to evaluate costs and benefits of proposed programmes so that evidence-
based information and analysis is available to underpin decision making’ (Office of the 
Comptroller and Auditor General 2010).  
But even with a full panoply of expert advice available, the extent of the discretion available 
to the Minister for Finance in Ireland is considerable. This office-holder is relatively 
unconstrained by serious parliamentary scrutiny of budget proposals, as noted earlier, 
despite the publication of estimates in advance of the formal budget. Nor is the Minister 12 
 
seriously responsible even to the government as a whole, and even the prime minister or 
Taoiseach is said typically to know relatively little of the detail of what the Budget contains 
until it is revealed in public. The Finance Act can provide some scope for incorporating 
changes deemed necessary. But the consultation and consensus-seeking then operate post-
hoc and selectively. The weaknesses of the institutionalized checks and balances in Irish 
fiscal policy have attracted adverse attention, including from senior economists in the IMF. 
Among the reforms proposed is the establishment of an advisory fiscal council. It may be 
though that EU rules to establish stronger fiscal oversight will enforce procedural changes 
where Irish politicians have been reluctant to act (Lane 2009; 2010; Mody 2010; Van 
Rompuy 2010).  
Organizational fragmentation and policy coordination 
Time-inconsistent policy preferences on the part of Irish governments is further exacerbated 
by the organizational fragmentation of the Irish public service itself, which has militated 
against opportunities for policy coordination. The routines surrounding cross-departmental 
consultation about legislative proposals and submission of plans to cabinet have changed 
very little over time. The traditional complaints about the civil service, that the ‘stovepipes’ 
of government Departments operate in relative isolation from one another, have been 
addressed to some degree by increased interactions between senior civil servants, and the 
creation of interdepartmental working groups and task forces coordinated by the 
Department of the Taoiseach for particular purposes. But these tend to be ad hob 
measures, partial remedies for structural features that are not significantly altered once the 
temporary coordinating apparatus lapses.  
The Irish public service has not escaped the influence of New Public Management thinking, 
which resulted in wholesale reorganization of policy planning and service delivery in many 
areas of the British public service. But in the absence of a strong political driver, many of the 
changes had a limited range, and even measures addressing performance monitoring and 
service delivery were much more superficial than in other Westminster-type systems 
(Hardiman and MacCarthaigh 2011 forthcoming).  13 
 
One of the striking features of Irish public administration has been the rapid growth in the 
number of state agencies, particularly in the period since 1990, as Figure 6 shows. 
Figure 6 here 
The rate of agency creation outstripped the rate of agency termination or merger by a 
considerable margin. The functional activity that showed the most marked increase was that 
of service delivery, as Figure 7 shows. As regulatory activities expanded, so also did the 
number of agencies carrying out regulatory functions. And there was also a sharp rise in the 
number of bodies with either statutory or non-statutory public functions devoted to 
advising government, being available in a consultative capacity, or representing various civil 
society interests to government.  
Figure 7 here 
But these trends should not be taken as evidence of any hiving off of core state activities 
into independent agencies, as New Public Management would advocate, since core civil 
service staffing was not reduced, nor were budgets or central decision-making delegated. 
Some agency creation clearly stemmed from the need to increase policy capacity in specific 
areas and to expand the range of specialist expertise working in a dedicated way – agencies 
devoted to industrial policy, for example, show this kind of pattern (Hardiman and 
MacCarthaigh 2010; Ó Riain 2004).  
But this is far from the only reason why new agencies are established. The OECD review of 
the Irish public service, published in 2008, commented that among the most common 
reasons for setting up new agencies were the perceived value of signalling and embodying 
new policy priorities; involving stakeholders; providing executive bodies with managerial 
flexibility; bringing in specialised skills; allowing more performance focus; and responding to 
European Union requirements related to the independence of regulators (OECD 2008, 
pp.297-8). It concluded that the principal reason why government ministers created such a 
large number of new agencies in Ireland was to make it possible to employ more staff, often 
more specialized staff, without appearing to breach limits on core departmental civil service 
numbers (OECD 2008: 295-8). This would appear to signal a perceived dearth of appropriate 14 
 
skills available within the core civil service itself. Indeed, the scale of expenditure on private 
consultancy fees has occasioned comment on more than one occasion by the Comptroller 
and Auditor General, most recently in connection with expenses arising from managing the 
banking crisis (Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General 2009, pp. 69-71). Yet the 
problems of appropriate skill recruitment and deployment have never seriously been 
tackled. 
The problems for policy coordination between Departments and agencies that are 
generated by organizational fragmentation are considerable. The OECD report commented 
critically on the absence of guiding criteria governing organizational reform in Ireland. And 
although Ireland had experienced several waves of political interest in public sector reform, 
by 2010 it was only beginning to start on the process of organizational review, prompted as 
much by considerations of financial stringency as by the ‘public sector transformation 
agenda’ (Report of the Special Group on Public Service Numbers and Expenditure 
Programmes 2009). 
Managing the cost base 
The capacity of the Irish economy to grow its way out of recession and to begin to create 
employment opportunities again is said to be impaired not only by the scale of the fiscal 
crisis and the related liabilities on the public purse incurred by the need to rescue the 
financial system, but also by the decline in competitiveness that took place since about the 
year 2000. A standard way of measuring competitiveness is to compare unit labour costs, 
and Figure 8 suggests that Ireland lost competitiveness more rapidly than the 
Mediterranean EU cohesion states. 
Figure 8 
The rate of increase of employee pay therefore tends to be the primary focus in considering 
the underpinnings of competitiveness (European Commission 2010, p.32). Regling and 
Watson noted that: 
Compensation per employee, which had grown more or less in line with the euro 
area average until 1996, increased at two to three times the euro area average from 15 
 
1997 to 2008. In nominal terms, annual gross wages in Ireland in 2007 were the 
highest in the euro area except Luxembourg (Regling and Watson 2010, pp. 21-2).  
 
The most common inference to be drawn from these trends is that employee wages had 
gone on a runaway upward trend. In a situation of both fiscal crisis and recessionary 
conditions, the focus therefore tends to be on wage growth as both the source of the 
problem and the heart of the solution. There are three reasons why reducing nominal wages 
may be held to be necessary in these conditions. Firstly, when applied to the public sector, it 
offers a relatively simple way of relieving pressure on the public sector pay roll. Secondly, it 
seems to represent a logical approach to regaining competitiveness in export markets, 
because in a monetary union where it is not possible to devalue the currency, ‘internal 
devaluation’ is the only relative cost adjustment mechanism. And thirdly, the contention is 
sometimes put forward that at a time of consumer price deflation, wages should not be 
downwardly sticky but should follow price trends and yet would still maintain real living 
standards. 
Each of these analyses is problematic, and conflict over how they were to be understood 
and acted upon proved the breaking point for the institutions of social partnership in 2009, 
after over twenty years of institutionalized wage bargaining. It might even be said that the 
tensions that resulted in the end of centralized wage setting owed their origins to the early 
2000s. For what is at issue is not a simple clash over the rate at which employee pay is set, 
but a broader set of interactions between pay, productivity, inflation, and credit, all of which 
shape the cost base of the economy. The origins of Ireland’s loss of competitiveness cannot 
be understood without considering all these contributory factors, and any revival of 
consultative processes will be unable simply to revive the old model and will be obliged to 
invent new processes that take account of all these factors. 
An exclusive focus on employee pay compensation is problematic for a number of reasons, 
quite apart from the concerns about removing purchasing power and therefore demand 
from the economy, and shrinking the revenue base from which corrections to the public 
finances must also come. Firstly, the other domestic drivers of employee pay rates need to 
be taken into account. We would expect that pay rates would be pushed upward under 16 
 
conditions of near-full employment and in sectors where skills were at a premium; this was 
indeed apparent in sectors such as construction and ICT. This would normally be expected 
to act as a brake on the expansion of these sectors. But in the context of the cheaply 
available credit that flooded the economy, the inflow to funds to new projects was not 
curbed in the ordinary way. Furthermore, the fiscal incentives behind the property boom 
actually intensified its effects instead of curbing it. Among the consequences of this was that 
the trend in unit labour costs lagged the trend in house prices. A growing portion of the 
Consumer Price Index was accounted for by the cost of housing itself. The upward surge in 
the cost of land and of property contributed significantly to inflation and therefore to the 
upward pressures on employee wages (ICTU 2010). Meanwhile, domestic inflation rates 
were further intensified by pro-cyclical government spending and a heavy reliance on 
indirect taxation (Hardiman 2004). 
Secondly, in the exporting sector of the Irish economy, neither unit labour costs nor overall 
cost competitiveness of goods and services was significantly impaired in export markets 
during the 2000s (Breathnach 2010). This is largely explained by the capital intensity and 
buoyant profitability of the manufacturing export sector, where pay increases were more 
than matched by productivity increases. But it raises a question over the rationale for wage-
cutting in these sectors.  
Thirdly, discerning the relative cost components in the domestic sector is more complex. 
Productivity in the domestic manufacturing sector was lower than in the exporting sector, 
and the capital intensity is lower too. But the pressure to raise prices in the context of a 
buoyant market is not solely attributable to wage cost pressures.  
In the private sector services sector, it is more difficult to assess the relationship between 
costs and productivity. But here also, the argument has been made that wage inflation was 
far from being the sole determinant of changes in unit labour costs. Prices for consumer 
goods, or intermediate inputs to businesses such as rents and energy costs, were also 
significant contributors to input costs to the domestic business sector. A survey of retailers 
did indeed find that a key driver or rising costs was the increasing cost of labour, which 
respondents attributed to a variety of factors including high labour market demand, the 17 
 
relatively high minimum wage, and the need for security personnel in Dublin outlets. But 
they also replied that there were other factors that were also very important to them, 
including high operating costs especially concerning property and utilities (energy, waste, 
etc.). They commented that local services, including professional fees, were particularly 
costly. Indeed, legal fees were identified as being almost double those in Belfast and about 
50% more expensive than in London (Forfás 2008a, pp. 9, 16, 25).  
The relationship between cost inputs and productivity are especially difficult to estimate in 
the public sector. Comparisons of the relative earnings of private and public service 
employees are bedevilled by considerations of the age and skills profile of each. But the 
principal changes to the terms and conditions of employment in the public sector were 
political decisions, in the form of Review Body reports on higher civil servants, and the 
‘benchmarking’ of other public sector pay rates. Neither of these processes was tied to 
formal productivity measurements. The true scale of relativities between public and private 
sector remuneration remain contested (E Kelly, McGuinness and O'Connell 2009; O'Leary 
2002). 
In summary, nominal unit labour cost compresses a variety of contributions to 
competitiveness into a single measure. The capital intensity of production, and the extent of 
self-employment and especially professional self-employment, affect measures of 
productivity. The volume of credit available in the economy and the way fiscal policy is used 
either as a countervailing or augmenting influence may have a significant effect on the 
changing relative costs of factor inputs. In a comparative analysis of the EU member states 
that had suffered the greatest competitiveness losses, a European Trade Union Institute 
economist concluded that changes in competitiveness were dominated by the product 
market, not the labour market, as illustrated in Figure 9. 
Figure 9 here 
The implication is that in the business sector, attempts to improve international 
competitiveness should focus on non-wage costs to firms as the primary target of policy 
intervention (O'Farrell 2010, p.21).  18 
 
Insofar as Ireland is also identified as having a problem with labour costs, it is of course 
impossible to soften the adjustment costs through a competitive devaluation; the dominant 
solution advocated across the Eurozone is to implement a form of ‘internal devaluation’. 
Unlike currency devaluations, which impose relative losses of purchasing power on 
everyone, the impact of relative labour cost adjustment falls mainly on employees. And 
because the government does not have much purchase on private sector wage-setting, a 
disproportionate adjustment is forced upon those who are in public sector employment, 
and those in receipt of state transfers among whom are counted many of the most 
vulnerable. Direct budget-based spending cuts of this sort are a relatively crude instrument 
whose consequences can be difficult to legitimate with reference to conceptions of equity 
or distributive justice. In the absence of sustained and visible measures to spread the costs 
of adjustment in other ways, such as addressing the various other contributors to 
competitiveness, and reforming the incidence of taxation to ensure appropriate compliance 
from all revenue sources, broader concerns may well arise about the political sustainability 
of a prolonged strategy of fiscal austerity. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that the Irish experience of financial crisis has quite straightforward 
origins: it was a conventional, ‘plain vanilla’ kind of banking over-reach, when an 
unrestrained asset price bubble was unexpectedly burst by factors beyond domestic 
political control. But several other contributory factors must be taken into account to 
understand why it is that Ireland experienced the crisis in such a severe form, with such a 
dramatic loss of growth capacity and such a sudden surge in unemployment. Three factors 
have been identified. The first concerns the distortions that had accumulated in the Irish 
growth model itself, with an over-reliance on construction and an incapacity to manage the 
flow of cheap credit that followed from Eurozone membership. The second concerns the 
laxity of fiscal policy, grounded in weak political oversight of policy-making priorities and a 
dispersed and poorly coordinated public administration system. The result is a large 
measure of institutionalized autonomy for the Minister for Finance with few restraints on 
pursuit of pro-cyclical measures. The third factor was the loss of control of the domestic cost 19 
 
base. Employee wages form part of this, but are not necessarily the driving factor nor even 
perhaps the most important element. 
Ireland’s membership of the Eurozone resulted in lower interest rates than were 
appropriate for an economy still on the upward curve of ‘catch-up’ economic growth. Along 
with the problems of managing a boom, Ireland was obliged to learn how to run  
macroeconomic policy within a single currency zone, where a premium is attached to 
domestic relative cost adjustments and in which considerably more activist fiscal policy is 
therefore required. The challenges proved overwhelming, and not only to Ireland. And yet in 
the absence of the protective cover of Eurozone membership, the consequences of the 
crisis would clearly have been yet more damaging, as the collapse of the Icelandic economy 
suggests. Domestic economic crises across Europe have refocused attention on the EU 
capacity to provide a coherent coordinating framework. But only domestic political actors 
can undertake the systematic reform of the domestic institutional weaknesses revealed by 
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Source: EU AMECO, unemployment and GDP data, May 2010  
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Figure 3. Euro-area public interventions in the banking sector, % GDP 
 
             
 
Approved  Effective 
          Austria  32.8  8.7 
          Belgium  92  26.7 
          Finland  27.7  0 
          France  18.1  5.6 
          Germany  24.4  9.1 
          Greece  11.4  4.6 
          Ireland*  231.8  229.4 
          Italy  1.3  0 
          Netherlands  52  25.4 
          Portugal  12.5  3.3 
          Slovenia  32.8  0.4 
          Spain  12.1  5 
          Euro Area  25.4  11.5 
          EU27  31.2  12.6 
         
                * Mostly guarantees on bank liabilities 
 
  Approved: Amounts approved in state aid decisions by the Commission under State aid 
rules. Effective: Amounts from schemes effectively implemented, for example capital 
effectively injected in banks or State guarantees effectively granted to banks on their 
issuance of liabilities.  
Data covers approved measures from June 2008 to 17 July 2009 and effective measures 
from June 2008 to mid-May 2009. 
 
Source: European Commission. 2010. Annual Report on the Euro Area 2009: European 
Economy 6, Table 2.1, p.46  
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Figure 4 Gross domestic expenditure on research and development, % GDP 
 
 Source: OECD Factbook 2010, OECD.Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx 
Accessed September 2010 24 
 
Figure 5. General government net borrowing/net lending  
 
 
Source: OECD Factbook 2010, OECD.Stat Extracts, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx Accessed 
September 2010 25 
 
Figure 6. New state agencies by decade 
 
 
Source: Mapping the Irish State database, http://geary.ucd.ie/mapping (Hardiman, 
MacCarthaigh and Scott 2010) 26 
 
Figure 7. Number of state agencies by function, 1958-2008 
 




Figure 8. Relative unit labour costs compared to the Euro area 
 
Source: (Regling and Watson 2010, p.22) 28 
 
Figure 8. Components of loss of competitiveness 
 
Source: (O'Farrell 2010, p.20) 29 
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